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DCI/IC-77-0742 25 February 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Production Assessment and

Improvement Division, OPEI/ICS

FROM

SUBJECT

Special Assistant to the D/DCI/IC

Systemic Problems in Intelligence Analysis

on the Soviet Union

- 1. Reference is your memorandum of 11 February (which I received on 23 February), subject as above, and its attached paper on "Intelligence Community Posture for Estimates on the Soviet Union."
- 2. I strongly favor Alternative 2 of the outlined course of action, with changes as indicated below. In my view, active pursuit of Alternative 2 should be a priority task of PAID/OPEI.
 - a. I see no need for this becoming a PRC item unless or until a price tag has been costed out. The DCI is responsible for production of national intelligence and the NFIB is his advisory group in this arena. While the PRC has inherited the CFI function to "establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence," the CFI/PRC effort to date has been thoroughly focused on resource-related issues.
 - b. Before the project is surfaced to the DCI and NFIB, I suggest that a final section of your paper be prepared within ICS which offers a strawman as to what needs to be done and specifically how it is proposed the Community get on with the tasks. The strawman should then be offered by the DCI to NFIB as a preliminary paper to be addressed by a task group representing NFIB Principals. This task group would have something to put its teeth into from the start.

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP831100171R000500210004-6

- c. The ICS/NIO examination of ways to make NIEs more cost effective is, in my view, sufficiently different from the problems to be addressed by the NFIB task group that it should be handled separately.
- d. Planning for the "user-community consortium" concerned with a systematic approach to net assessments I suggest should be part of the mission of the NFIB task group.
- 3. I consider Alternative 2 far preferable to the "loosely connected series of get-well actions" to which Alternative 1 refers.
- 4. Likewise, I view Alternative 3 as an unattractive proposal since the direct support and commitment of the DCI is essential to consummation of the project, and this is best attained through the DCI/NFIB channel rather than through "an inner group of Community elite." I recognize the proposed Alternative 3 might be looked upon as a means of fostering a direct DCI/ASD(I) approach to the problem, without recourse to NFIB channels, but NFIB, not the ASD(I), is the DCI's advisory support on production matters.
- 5. The draft paper is well done, but I suggest a few editorial changes:
 - a. Page 3, sixth line: Delete "Thus" since the same word is used to open the next sentence on line eight.
 - b. Page 3, fifth line from bottom: Substitute "competitor" for "competition."
 - c. Page 5, first line of text: Substitute "effective"
 for "effectively."
- 6. Getting agreement on even an approach to the problems raised in the PAID paper will not be easy. The OSR comments on article in the Fall 1976 Supplement of "Studies in Intelligence"--"Improving Strategic Intelligence Methodology: Estimating the Soviet Five Year Plan"--are an example of what may be the reaction from at least some production analysts.

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cc: Director, OPEI/ICS

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